Abstract: Behavioral economists increasingly argue that violations of rationality axioms provide a new rationale for paternalism-to "de-bias" individuals who exhibit errors, biases and other allegedly pathological psychological regularities associated with Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) heuristics-and-biases program. The argument is flawed, however, in neglecting to distinguish aggregate from individual rationality. The aggregate consequences of departures from normative decision-making axioms may be Pareto-inferior or superior. Without a well-specified theory of aggregation, individual-level biases do not necessarily imply losses in efficiency. This paper considers the problem of using a social-welfare function to decide whether to regulate risk-taking behavior in a population whose individual-level behavior may or may not be consistent with expected utility maximization. According to the social-welfare objective, unregulated aggregate risk distributions resulting from non-maximizing behavior are often more acceptable (i.e., lead to a weaker rationale for paternalism) than population distributions generated by behavior that conforms to the standard axioms. Thus, psychological theories that depart from axiomatic decision-making norms do not necessarily strengthen the case for paternalism, and conformity with such norms is generally not an appropriate policy-making objective in itself.
Introduction
By now it is uncontroversial to assert that real-world decision makers frequently depart from the prescriptions of normative decision theory. What remains controversial is how that descriptive claim, which draws on psychological theory and a rich experimental literature, is to be interpreted and used in the analysis of economic policy.
At the heart of the controversy surrounding psychology and economics, also known as behavioral economics, is the question: If one accepts challenges to the assumptive paradigm of economic rationality, does it follow that governments should pursue policies of benevolent paternalism?
1
There are two main lines of argument concerning paternalism based on different interpretations of the experimental record. Some argue that behavioral economics has succeeded in identifying a body of well-established decision-making biases that justify government intervention, or at least minor institutional modifications to help individuals avoid systematically mistaken behavior resulting in ex post regret. There is a range of positions supportive of at least limited forms of paternalism or its subtle variant, opposition to anti-paternalism (i.e., anti-anti-paternalism).
2 For instance, Sunstein and Thaler (2003) and Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue that because preferences have been shown to be unstable in a number of policy-relevant settings, neutral or a-paternalistic policies do not exist. According to Thaler and Sunstein, institu- tions necessarily establish defaults that function as anchors or frames and influence patterns of choice. Therefore, policy makers should be openly strategic in establishing institutions that are as helpful as possible, particularly with regard to defaults.
1 See, for example, Sunstein (1997) , Ng (1999 Ng ( , 2003 , Sheshinski (2002 Sheshinski ( , 2003 , Sunstein and Thaler (2003) , Thaler and Sunstein (2003) , Camerer et al (2003) , O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003) , Caplin and Leahy (2003) , Bernheim and Rangel (2004) , Kopcke et al (2004) , and Frey and Stutzer (2004) . 2 Suber (1999) provides a definition of paternalism in historical context with discussion of related philosophical issues.
extent and is therefore paternalistic. Failing to deal with the inevitability that institutions influence preferences, Thaler and Sunstein argue that anti-paternalism is willfully noncommittal as a normative approach because it refuses to take a clear stand concerning better and worse distributions of property rights.
3
Thaler and Sunstein see opportunities for policy makers to beneficially influence individual choice by wisely selecting institutional defaults (e.g., whether employees must opt in or opt out of savings programs; whether individuals are presumed to be organ donors or non-donors; and whether auto insurance policies are mandated to include or exclude the right to sue for punitive damages, allowing for opt-out and opt-in options, respectively). They argue that prescriptive guidelines for setting institutional defaults that include opt-out provisions do not coerce but rather frame choice in socially useful ways. Thus, opposition to anti-paternalism can, they claim, be libertarian in spirit.
Based on the theoretical behavioral economics literature and findings from psychological experiments, O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003) advocate what they call asymmetric paternalism, making a stronger case for policies aimed at influencing individual choice than Thaler and Sunstein call for. The goal of asymmetric paternalism is to help those with self-control problems cut back on "sinful" consumption (i.e., consumption followed by regret) while imposing minimal burden on those who indulge rationally, that is, without regret. Bernheim and Rangel (2004) appear to take a similar view of behavioral economics as a subdiscipline whose primary focus is pathologically biased decision making, carrying with it the implication of an expanded scope (relative to other subfields in economics) for welfare-improving paternalistic 3 Thaler and Benartzi (2004) follow Raiffa (1982) in distinguishing normative theory, which establishes an ideal benchmark based on optimization, from prescriptive theory, which attempts to advise decision makers how to move closer to that ideal.
regulation. The view is not unusual. Behavioral economists have argued that myopia among retirement savers legitimizes forced savings programs (Aaron, 1999; Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2005) ; that overconfidence justifies required coolingoff periods before finalizing large consumer purchases and financial decisions (Camerer et al, 2003) ; and that imprecise and costly decision making creates new reasons for governments to restrict consumer choice sets through regulation (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Sheshinski, 2003; Schwartz, 2004) . The medical ethics and behavioral law and economics literatures complement the abundant theoretical work in behavioral economics by providing numerous applications in which difficult questions of paternalism arise, for example Gruber (2002) , Slovic (2000) , Sunstein, Schkade and Kahneman (2000) , Schneider (1998 ), Elster (1992 ), VanDeVeer (1986 .
In an opposing interpretation of the empirical failures of the standard rationality paradigm, economists and psychologists have argued that aggregates of limitedinformation decision makers using heuristics, or rules of thumb, can achieve high levels of economic performance and social coordination without complete descriptions of their environments or well-defined objective functions (Arthur, 1994; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977; Hayek, 1945; Herrmann-Pillath, 1996; Hildebrand, 1994; Kirman, 1983 and 1993; Kysar et al, forthcoming; Lesourne, 1992; Rossi, 2004; Smith, 2003; Tisdell, 1996; Vriend, 1995) . Although it remains an open question the extent to which departures from standard normative benchmarks in economics can be rationalized as adaptive with respect to intuitively reasonable alternative performance criteria, the phenomenon of adaptiveness-enhancing departures from usual normative benchmarks has been documented in a variety of theoretical settings. For example, organisms whose decision rules are based on a few cues rather than high-dimensional constrained optimization may enjoy improved survival chances when the environment undergoes periodic cataclysmic change (Bookstaber and Langsam, 1985) . Simple heuristics such as mimicking one's peers can induce additional risk-taking and consequently improve average returns in a risky investment task (Berg and Lien, 2003) .
Distortion of investors' beliefs away from rational expectations can move financial markets with asymmetric information to Pareto-superior equilibria (Berg and Lien, 2005) . By the criterion of accuracy for out-of-sample prediction (i.e., cross-validation rather than data fitting), information-frugal prediction rules have been shown to unambiguously outperform large regression models using various real-world data sets (Gigerenzer et al, 1999) . And Cosmides and Tooby (1994) describe the human mind's specialization for handling regularly occurring problems in our hunter-gatherer past as "better than rational" when rationality is defined according to the standard definition in economics, as a set of content-blind axioms or norms for general problem solving.
Accordingly, the psychological view of man, together with the observation that aggregates of boundedly rational individuals frequently find solutions to coordination problems that the best informed experts cannot (Simon, 1978 (Simon, , 1982 Epstein, 1995 Epstein, , 2004 Surowiecki, 2004) , may be interpreted as supportive of a decentralized or laissez faire approach to policy. 4 Asserting a positive link between psychology and anti-paternalism, however, is just as much of an over-generalization as asserting that there are links in the opposite direction. This paper argues instead that alleged links between psychological models of man and arguments concerning paternalism rest on selective emphases of the psychological literature and narrow definitions of rationality.
Our claim is that the policy implications of theoretical and empirical departures from neoclassical rational choice are indeterminate. Without specifying more institutional detail, committing to specific social-welfare metrics, and imposing auxiliary assump-4 A more traditional price-adjustment argument that reaches a similar conclusion is given by Caplan (1999) , who argues that the price mechanism can achieve optimal levels of irrationality, concentrating irrationality in decision domains where its costs are low.
tions about social interaction and the problem of aggregation, psychology implies no definitive position on paternalism.
This is not to say, however, that theorizing about paternalism should be avoided.
On the contrary, political-economic debates about the role of government and institutional design generate a legitimate need for theoretical arguments, pro and con, concerning paternalism. The paternalism question is, in practice, substantive and deserves serious consideration rather than cursory judgments based on a priori ideological conviction. Hayek, for example, in a single publication, opposed redistribution in principle while endorsing the idea of a "safety net" in particular instances (Caldwell, 2004 The model is a descriptive account of the policy maker's reasoning process rather than an efficiency argument in favor of any particular level of paternalism. To descriptively address the question of how behavioral hypotheses influence reasoning about paternalistic intervention, it is not necessary to take a stand on whether the policy maker is right or wrong in his or her definition of excessive risk. This is analogous to the optimal tax literature's convention of taking the tax authority's goal of raising a pre-specified quantity of revenue as exogenously given.
It is assumed that lies on the unit interval with = 0 indicating zero desire for intervention and = 1 indicating a preference for the absolute abolishment of risk-taking in the specified domain. The extremes of zero intervention and absolute abolishment are not uncommon among real-world policy responses to risky behavior.
For example, restrictions limiting the amount of minutes individuals can spend jogging are virtually unheard of, while bans forbidding the use of cocaine in any amount are nearly universal. Intermediate restrictions (0 < < 1) are probably even more common, examples of which are discussed subsequently.
The policy maker's preferences over population distributions of risktaking
Corresponding to every fully-specified behavioral theory θ is a pre-regulation population distribution of individual risk-taking represented by the pdf f θ (x) where x denotes risk-taking actions ranging from minimum (x = 0) to maximum (x = 1) risk. The pdf f θ (x) always denotes the pre-regulation distribution, and regulated risk-taking distributions are expressed in terms of it. The risk-taking action of a generic individual drawn at random from a population whose behavior is distributed according to theory θ is denoted x θ .
The model assumes that the policy maker decides on whether the paternalistic policy > 0 should be implemented by assigning to a social-welfare score and comparing it with the social-welfare score for the zero-regulation case. 5 Social-welfare scores carry the disadvantage, however, of depending on difficult-to-measure parameters needed to weight different choices of x, to quantify social costs, and to account for the costs of implementing and administering . The following section investigates conditions under which policy-specific parameters drop out of the policy maker's social-welfare comparison of behavioral hypotheses. The parameters drop out because variation in social welfare is generated by the policy maker's consideration of different behavioral hypotheses (i.e., variation in θ) rather than changes in the paternalism parameter (i.e., variation in ).
Quantifying the policy maker's rationale for paternalism as the social-welfare gains from regulation provides the basic tool for modeling policy responses to changing behavioral assumptions. To see how the rationale for paternalism changes when the behavioral theory f θ 0 (x) is replaced by f θ 1 (x), a difference in differences is computed:
the gains from regulation when f θ 1 (x) describes the unregulated population minus the gains from regulation when f θ 0 (x) is the unregulated distribution. There are actually four risk-taking distributions used in the difference-in-differences computation,
5 Non-social-welfare metrics would also be possible, for example, if the policy maker were a rent seeker or acted on more complex political motives. The social-welfare quantification of the rationale for paternalism serves as a natural benchmark, uncomplicated by incentive problems and descriptively accurate in the event that those in power are benevolent and well-informed about economics.
two unregulated distributions under the behavioral hypotheses θ 1 and θ 0 , and two regulated distributions (i.e., with policy in place) under those same hypotheses.
As mentioned already, the symbol f θ (x) always denotes the unregulated distribution.
Using a simple theory of how regulation affects behavior, the regulated distribution can be expressed in terms of it.
Under a condition derived below, the policy maker's preferences over population distributions of risk-taking simplifies to the following rule: the policy maker has a stronger rationale for paternalism (i.e., inclination to intervene) under hypothesis θ 1 relative to hypothesis θ 0 whenever there is more weight in the upper tail of f θ 1 (x)
defined by the cut-off point
to as the maximum allowable risk threshold. For example, a laissez faire policy maker with no taste for paternalism chooses paternalism parameter = 0, which implies a maximum allowable risk threshold of 1. Accordingly, the policy maker is equally satisfied with every continuous risk-taking distribution on the unit interval because they all have zero weight under the upper tail cut off by 1 − = 1. In contrast, a maximally paternalistic policy maker regards any positive level of risk-taking as undesirable. For intermediate levels of preference for paternalism (i.e., 0 < < 1), the simplified preference structure implies that the policy maker has a stronger rationale for -level paternalism under hypothesis θ 1 (relative to hypothesis θ 0 ) if and only
The simplified preference structure can be rationalized by showing that the difference-in-differences measure described above reduces to a monotonic function of the rate of excessive risk-taking defined by:
Welfare
This section provides conditions under which a policy preference structure that ranks risk-taking distributions according to the weight in their upper tails can be rationalized by a social-welfare function.
Suppose w(x) is a weighting function that nets out social costs generated by externalities or hypothesized psychological biases. Let k( ) be an increasing function that represents the costs of implementing and enforcing the policy . The following socialwelfare function provides a conventional tool for ranking combinations of behavioral (θ), policy ( ), social-cost (w(x)) and policy-cost (k( )) parameters:
An assumption built into the social-welfare function (2) is that the policy-enforcement technology is effective in obtaining compliance, so that individuals who choose excessive risk in the pre-regulation case (i.e., the fraction of the population such that x θ > 1 − ) clusters at the maximum allowable risk threshold x = 1 − once regulation is imposed. Non-compliance costs are folded into k( ). The first term of the social-welfare function sums net benefits over individuals in the interior of the acceptable risk-taking spectrum. The second term accounts for net benefits generated by the fraction of the population
dx that clusters at the maximum allowable risk point after regulation is imposed. The third term subtracts implementation and administration costs k( ). Imposing the normalization k(0) = 0, the social-welfare function evaluated at the minimum and maximum levels of paternalism, respectively,
Because policy implementation is costly, policy makers who seek to maximize SW θ ( ) will impose risk-limiting regulation (i.e., set > 0) only when net benefits as measured by w(x) are decreasing. To see why (assuming differentiability), note that
Because the costs of implementing paternalism are increasing in , the second term,
and cannot be a social-welfare maximizer. Thus, if > 0 is a social-welfare maximizer, it must be the case that
We quantify the policy maker's rationale for paternalism at , denoted ∆SW θ ( ), as the gains in social welfare achieved by regulation relative to the zero-intervention social-welfare reference point:
The integral sums the social savings attributable to the policy, and the final term subtracts its costs. The integrand is guaranteed to be positive if w(x) is decreasing to the right of x = 1 − , although the sign of the rationale for paternalism is indeterminate.
If the policy maker had reliable knowledge of f θ (x), w(x) and k(x), then a necessary condition for rationalizing paternalism would be ∆SW θ ( ) > 0. As mentioned before, the disadvantage of ∆SW θ ( ) is that it depends on parameters that cannot be determined without specifying the benefits and costs of risk-taking and the available technology for enforcement and administration. However, we demonstrate now that, for fixed , ∆SW θ ( ) is monotonically increasing in the much simpler upper-tail probability ρ θ , which is independent of w(x) and k(x).
When is the rationale for paternalism monotonic in ρ θ ?
To state a precise condition under which ∆SW θ (x) is monotonic in ρ θ , we examine the
∆SW θ (x)| , which measures the response of the rationale for paternalism (as defined in (4)) to a small increase in ρ θ caused by a shift in the policy maker's behavioral hypothesis. The difference-in-differences calculation described earlier plays a key role because it provides a finite approximation for the derivative's numerator and shares its sign.
To increase ρ θ by a small increment requires a perturbation of f θ (x) that redistributes a small slice from the left of x = 1 − to the right-hand upper tail.
There are many such perturbations. We consider a special class of them under which the slice is defined by arbitrarily chosen points and re-distributed uniformly to the upper tail (i.e., between x = 1 − and x = 1). Let δ 0 and δ 1 denote arbitrarily chosen numbers such that 0 < δ 0 < δ 1 < 1 − . The numbers define an interval,
, strictly to the left of 1 − from which probability mass is to be removed and redistributed to the upper tail. The fraction of the population that is re-distributed in the perturbation is
The perturbed risk-taking pdf is:
e l s e w h e r e .
The term in brackets is the normalizing constant that re-distributes the removed mass uniformly on the upper tail of length . Recall that the un-perturbed pre-regulation social-welfare function was given by
In contrast, the perturbed pre-regulation social-welfare function is:
After imposing the risk-limiting regulatory policy , all those whose pre-regulation actions were in the upper tail are, analogous to the un-perturbed case, assumed to move to x = 1 − . In the perturbed case, those clustering at x = 1 − include the re-distributed population (moved from δ 0 < x < δ 1 to 1 − < x < 1 under perturbation, and then to the point x = 1 − by the policy). Thus, the perturbed social-welfare function evaluated at is:
The difference ofS W θ ( ) andS W θ (0) yields the perturbed rationale for paternalism:
The expression above is the rationale for paternalism computed by the policy maker after adopting an alternative behavioral theory with a slightly heavier upper tail.
The first integral is the sum of social savings attributable to the policy based on the un-perturbed distribution just as before (c.f., equation (4)). The second bracketed expression is the average social savings attributable to the policy among individuals who were re-distributed to the upper tail by the perturbation. Under regulation, re-distributed individuals cluster at x = 1 − and are assigned weight w(1 − ). The average pre-regulation weight assigned to them was
The difference-in-differences calculation measuring the response of the rationale for paternalism with respect to a small change in ρ θ while holding constant is:
The expression provides the numerator for the approximation of the derivative. The derivative can now be computed as: One obvious case in which the sign of the derivative is positive and monotonicity therefore holds is when w(x) is decreasing to the right of 1 − , as would be the case when social or psychological costs accumulate faster than the individual benefits of risk-taking at levels above the maximum allowable risk threshold. Result 1 provides a social-welfare rationalization for relying on ρ θ as a parsimonious proxy for the policy maker's inclination toward paternalism-parsimonious in the sense that ρ θ is independent of context-specific social-welfare weights and policy costs. When considering two behavioral hypotheses, the policy maker's willingness to incur costs to implement the proposed restriction will be greater under the hypothesis that predicts the heavier upper tail. This does not imply that will necessarily be worth its price, k( ), according to either theory. To answer the more difficult question of whether implementation should actually occur, knowledge of w(x) and k( ) is required. The advantage of the difference-in-differences metric in equation (9) is that it provides a monotonic transformation of the change in willingness-to-pay for a proposed restriction on risk-taking under distinct behavioral hypotheses, without requiring all parameters needed to specify the social-welfare function. Thus, one may investigate whether hypothesis θ 0 or θ 1 leads to a greater willingness-to-pay for simply by examining the upper-tail probabilities of the unregulated risk distributions, ρ θ 0 and ρ θ 1 .
The rate of excessive risk-taking ρ θ provides a means of ranking behavioral hypotheses according to the degree to which they favor risk-limiting paternalism without fully specifying the social-welfare function.
A limitation of the social-welfare perturbation as modeled above is that the cost of policy k( ) is assumed constant with respect to changes in ρ θ . This may be reasonable for small changes in ρ θ and for some policies whose costs are relatively insensitive to individual risk-taking within fairly wide bounds (e.g., the cost of lifeguards and markers for safe swimming areas at public beaches). One could also generalize the socialwelfare function by allowing k( ) to respond positively to perturbations of ρ θ . The relevant condition for monotonicity would then require that [w(1− )
is large relative to
This would once again require knowledge of difficult-tomeasure social-welfare parameters, however, and we do not pursue the generalization here.
Endogenizing
This section presents an example with highly stylized functional forms with which it is straightforward to endogenize the policy maker's choice of in terms of exogenous social-cost and policy-cost parameters. Suppose the weighting function and policy cost functions are quadratic:
Assume that the policy maker adopts a uniform prior on x θ , so that f θ (x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and 0 elsewhere. In this case, the social-welfare function (2) takes on the form:
The first and second derivatives of (12) with respect to are:
Solving the first-order condition for a social-welfare-maximizing level of paternalism on the interior of the unit interval yields the formula:
The endpoints = 0 and = 1 must be checked to find out when * is the unique global maximizer. The maximum possible level of paternalism = 1 can be ruled out because SW θ (1) = −κ, implying that SW θ ( ) is decreasing at = 1 and therefore that social welfare can always be increased by reducing paternalism. The expressions in (13) show that the first derivative of the social-welfare function is zero at both = 0 and = * , and that the second derivative evaluated at those points has opposite signs:
Thus, the global social-welfare maximizer is * if c > κ, and zero otherwise. This condition is intuitive because it requires that the social costs (therefore, the social savings attributable to the regulation) are large relative to the policy's costs as a necessary condition for positive levels of paternalism.
The formula for * shows that, as one would expect, the optimal level of paternalism is decreasing in the policy-cost parameter κ and increasing in the social-cost-of-risktaking parameter c that scales the social savings from paternalism. The optimal level of paternalism approaches absolute abolishment of risk-taking as social costs grow infinitely larger than policy costs.
A descriptive model of prescriptive behavioral modeling
Previous sections provided definitions of the paternalism parameter, the maximum allowable risk threshold, the policy maker's notion of excessive risk, and the uppertail probability ρ θ , referred to as the rate of excessive risk-taking. Previous sections also provided a social-welfare rationalization for quantifying the rationale for paternalism in terms of ρ θ . Specifically, we modeled the policy maker's comparison of two behavioral hypotheses θ 0 and θ 1 in relative terms using the difference (ρ θ 0 − ρ θ 1 ) as a proxy for the fully specified social-welfare equivalent (∆SW θ 0 ( ) − ∆SW θ 1 ( )).
The remainder of the paper makes extensive use of this result to demonstrate that departures from expected-utility maximization produce changes in the rationale for paternalism that have an indeterminate sign. Given a policy proposal and returnsgenerating process γ, we compute rates of excessive risk-taking for the expectedutility-maximization hypothesis (ρ α ) and the satisficing hypothesis (ρ β ) to reveal that behavioral-hypothesis-induced changes in ρ θ may be either negative or positive.
The sign indeterminacy of (ρ α − ρ β ) turns out to be generic rather than special, with departures from maximization decreasing the rationale for paternalism in roughly 40 percent of cases (i.e., among possible combinations of and γ). Thus, failure to maximize does not imply an increased rationale for paternalism.
Flows of risk-taking opportunities
Technological innovation and institutional evolution generate an ongoing sequence of opportunities for individuals to take new forms of risk in pursuit of anticipated benefits. Innovation in medical science is one source of such opportunities (e.g., the advent of heart transplantation technology, the increasing availability of diagnostic tests for disease, and the expanding menu of cosmetic medical services). Cultural innovation produces a virtually continuous, although not steady, flow of fashion and lifestyle choices that entail risk-return trade-offs (e.g., extreme sports, new consumer products, new types of illicit drugs, and novel forms of coupling activity and sexual behavior). Financial institutions, both private and regulatory, represent another important channel through which new opportunities for risk-taking flow (e.g., bank deregulation, the introduction of new financial products, and technological innovations of the kind that enabled widespread online equity trading). 
γ + x with probability 1/2 x γ − x with probability 1/2,
where 0 < γ < 2. The parameter γ indicates whether the marginal expected return with respect to x is increasing (γ > 1), linear (γ = 1), or decreasing (γ < 1). Thus, γ summarizes the shape of the risk-return environment. The distribution R(x) has mean x γ and standard deviation x, although these should not automatically be interpreted as appropriate measures of subjective reward and risk without specifying a behavioral theory, such as expected-utility maximization, for which they are relevant statistics.
Paternalism and novel risk
Novel forms of risk are necessary for economic growth. At the same time, they are among the most difficult to analyze for the purpose of choosing a reasonable regulatory approach. It is usually unclear whether forward-looking behavior and self-correcting feedback brought about by market competition provide sufficient safeguards against the downside risks for which policy makers are held responsible. Even the most sophisticated statistical tools provide only limited insight when new risks with unknown frequencies and unknowable event spaces are concerned. Novel risks therefore imply nontrivial questions about the desirability of paternalism.
Concerning issues such as genetically modified food, nuclear power, and global warming, some argue that private incentives lead small groups to dishonestly gener-ate exaggerated fears. At the same time, others argue that private incentives lead to the suppression of important evidence about risks. It may also be the case that the available data are fundamentally ambiguous and cannot possibly provide a factual basis for regulatory consensus. When the empirical evidence is weak, few constraints bound even the most rigorous attempts to apply scientific reasoning to policy design.
Consequently, there are many degrees of freedom in formulating logically coherent approaches to policy. The policy maker's choice of behavioral hypotheses in making predictions about the effects of different policies and their benefits and costs is an important variable that can lead to markedly different decisions about regulatory approach. The enlarged set of behavioral hypotheses recently entering into economics from psychology, which includes numerous alternatives to expected-utility maximization, therefore represents an interesting new source of variation in economic arguments for different levels of paternalism.
Two behavioral hypotheses
In this section, we introduce two specific behavioral hypotheses, labeled α and β, which give rise to distributions of risk-taking behavior, denoted x a and x b , both with support [0, 1]. The hypotheses correspond to two idealized models of behavior, one psychological and boundedly rational, and the other economic and unboundedly rational. This set-up would apply, for example, to a policy maker who consults with two sets of economic advisors, the first of which offers advice based on psychological models drawn from behavioral economics, and the second of which bases its advice on standard expected-utility theory. aspirations. An aspiration distribution describes the population's heterogeneity and a random draw from this distribution is denoted a. Hypothesis α represents one version of bounded rationality, or psychological man, as hypothesized by Simon (1982) .
Aspiration-seekers are referred to as satisficers, or α-types. It is commonly assumed that societies of β-types are better off in an objective social-welfare sense and that normative decision theory should unequivocally aim to encourage people to become more β-like. We demonstrate, however, that societies of β-types are often more difficult to manage, requiring a greater degree of paternalistic intervention than societies of α-types.
Heterogeneity in aspirations and risk-aversion
Individual risk-taking in the real world is richly heterogeneous. Some try to avoid risks that others eagerly pursue. Most choose intermediate degrees of risk, insuring against some contingencies while betting on others. Both α-and β-hypotheses allow for such heterogeneity of risk-taking behavior. We assume that aspiration-seekers' aspirations and EU-maximizers' inverse risk aversion parameters are uniformly distributed on the unit interval:
The assumption implies that both aspirations and willingness to bear risk have finite upper bounds.
Decision rules
Recall from hypothesis α that an α-type with aspiration a begins at x = 0 and increases x until the aspiration condition E[R(x)] = a is met. No beliefs about the expected return or prior knowledge are required. The α-type simply observes other individuals' returns at each position along the search path, obtaining arbitrarily good estimates of average returns at each position, and stops search as soon as a goodenough average return is discovered. Solving E[R(x)] = a for x yields the α-type's decision rule:
In contrast, a β-type with risk-aversion parameter b is assumed to see the entire risk-return schedule R(x) instantaneously, with precise knowledge of its mean and variance, and choose x on the closed unit interval to maximize the expected-utility function:
The first-and second-order conditions for an interior local maximum are:
What is needed is an expression for the global maximizer that describes the behavior of a randomly drawn β-type in terms of the risk-aversion parameter b and returnsgenerating parameter γ. The first-order condition has two solutions, 0 and x * , defined as:
It turns out that x = 0 is never optimal because u(0) = 0 is always dominated by
* is in the admissible range (i.e., the interior of the unit interval) and the objective function is decreasing at x = 1:
x * is out of the admissible range (i.e., x * > 1) and u(1) > u(0), implying that x = 1 is the global maximizer. Putting these results together, the β-type's decision rule can be expressed as:
We note that there is one special case, γ = 1, in which psychological and economic hypotheses cannot be distinguished using aggregate-level statistics because x α and x β have the same distribution. The distributions are always distinct, however, for environments with γ = 1.
Result 2: For γ = 1:
Rationales for paternalism
Based on the earlier argument that rates of excessive risk-taking serve as a parsimonious proxy for the rationale for paternalism, we compute ρ α and ρ β to reveal whether satisficing or expected-utility maximization leads to a greater rationale for paternalism at level . Subsequent sections consider how the sign of ρ α − ρ β depends on policy and environment parameters and γ.
Using the decision rule (17) and the assumption that a is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the α-type population's rate of excessive risk-taking is computed as:
The computation of the rate of excessive risk-taking among β-types must take into account clustering at the maximum-risk point x = 1, which occurs whenever γ > b.
Making use of the assumption that
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the β-type population's rate of excessive risk-taking is:
As one would expect, after integrating over sources of individual heterogeneity, a and b, the rationales for paternalism as proxied by ρ α and ρ β depend on only two factors: the policy maker's maximum allowable risk threshold and the shape of the returns-generating environment. Table 1 presents rates of excessive risk-taking for different combinations of excessive risk thresholds (1 − ) and environments (γ). Table 1 clearly shows that, for every policy objective, either inequality may occur: ρ α > ρ β or ρ α < ρ β . According to the first row of Table 1 , a combination of a high preference for paternalism (only 10 percent of the risk spectrum is acceptable at 1 − = 0.10) and rapidly decreasing marginal returns (γ = 0.25) leads to rates of excessive risk-taking that are more than twice as severe under the expected-utility-maximization hypothesis as under the satisficing hypothesis (93 as opposed to 44 percent). Given the same preference for paternalism (1 − = 0.10) and an increasing returns environment such as γ = 1.75, however, the expected-utility-maximization hypothesis predicts a smaller rate of excessive risk-taking (68 compared to 98 percent among satisficers). The bottom block of Table 1 shows values of ρ α and ρ β corresponding to a far weaker degree of paternalism, a maximum allowable risk threshold of 1 − = 0.90. Again, we observe reversals in the sign of ρ α − ρ β depending on whether the marginal returns on risk-taking are increasing or decreasing.
Determinants of ρ
Another feature visible in Table 1 is the fluctuating ranges of ρ α and ρ β . For example, when the policy is 1 − = 0.25, the dispersion of ρ α is larger than that of ρ β , with ranges of 29 to 91 versus 60 to 76 percent. The relative dispersions are reversed for 1 − = 0.90, with ranges of 3 to 17 for ρ α versus 0 to 44 percent for ρ β . In general, the magnitudes of the percentage-point differences in rates of excessive risk-taking are large, clearly enough to sway a marginal policy maker toward or away from paternalism depending on which behavioral hypothesis is adopted. Also worth observing is the non-monotonicity of ρ β with respect to γ in the second and third blocks of Table 1 (corresponding to 1 − = 0.25 and 0.50 respectively). Non-monotonicity complicates attempts to generalize about the determinants of the magnitude of ρ α − ρ β .
We can generalize about the factors that determine the sign of ρ α − ρ β . there is a dense set of environments for which psychological man provides a smaller rationale for paternalism than economic man. The rectangle depicted in Figure 1 (with an area of 2) represents all possible pairs of (γ, 1 − ), and the fraction of those pairs for which psychology leads to a smaller rationale for paternalism can be computed as [
Result 3: For every policy objective 1 − = e −1/2 , there exist two dense sets of environments, one with ρ α > ρ β and the other with ρ α < ρ β .
Taxing risk
Consider a unit tax on risk-taking at the rate τ < 1. The after-tax return for an individual who chooses risk-taking x is R(x) − τ x, and the after-tax decision rules are:
Because x α conditional on a is increasing in τ for all a, the upper tail ρ α must also be increasing in τ . In contrast, x β is non-increasing in τ and so too is ρ β . 
The first formula indicates that α-types take on more risk in response to a positive user fee and ρ α increases as a result. The second formula implies that ρ β is non-increasing in φ.
Discussion
This paper attempts to model a policy maker's reasoning process about whether to impose paternalistic regulation that limits individual risk-taking. Given a proposed maximum allowable risk-taking threshold, the rationale for the paternalistic proposal is defined as the difference in social welfare post-and pre-regulation. We provide a condition under which this social-welfare difference is monotonic in the upper tail of the risk-taking distribution cut off by the policy maker's maximum allowable risk threshold. Monotonicity allows one to examine how various behavioral hypotheses affect the social-welfare difference by studying their effects on the much simpler rate of excessive risk-taking. The simplification provides a means of ranking the rationales for paternalism associated with different behavioral hypotheses without estimating difficult-to-measure parameters in the social-welfare function, such as those that scale the social costs of risk-taking and administrative costs of the policy. According to the model, a change in behavioral hypotheses changes the rationale for paternalism if and only if it makes distinct predictions about the upper tail of the risk-taking distribution and its response to interventions such as bans or taxes. The policy maker is more inclined to accept a paternalistic proposal (i.e., more willing to incur policy costs) under behavioral hypotheses that imply a heaver upper tail. The intuition for this is straightforward: the more severe excessive risk-taking is without regulation, the greater the social savings from enforcing a maximum allowable risk threshold is.
The paper's main result is that psychological departures from expected-utility maximization may either increase or decrease the policy maker's rationale for paternalism. For every policy objective, there exist two dense sets of environments: on the first set, satisficing implies a greater rationale for paternalism than expected-utility maximization does, and on the second set the inequality is reversed. The key point is that departures from maximization can reduce the costs of externalities and make laissez faire policy more attractive.
Despite the monotonicity result's motivation, which was to avoid having to fully specify the social-welfare function, the indeterminacy result described in the preceding paragraph underscores the need for context-specific policy analysis rather than generalizations based on ideology. The generalization we argue most vehemently against is the claim, now common in the behavioral economics literature, that when individuals fail to conform to the usual normative decision-making axioms, government should try to change individual behavior so that it more closely conforms. The model shows that for a large subset of environments, departures from maximization improve social welfare. Efforts to bring individuals into conformity with content-blind normative axioms (i.e., those that are applied invariantly across all decision-making domains) such as those based on formal logic and probability theory (e.g., the Savage axioms underlying the expected-utility hypothesis) may hurt the economy. Thus, conformity with content-blind norms is not an appropriate policy-making objective in itself. Rather, full specification of the social-welfare function is needed in each specific instance to provide a context-sensitive tally of the benefits and costs that determine whether departures from decision-making norms are harmful, helpful or benign.
A counterintuitive implication of the satisficing hypothesis is that a tax on risktaking induces greater risk-taking. The result depends on the fact that aspiration levels are fixed rather than fast-adjusting. When risk-taking is taxed, satisficers take on extra risk so that their after-tax expected returns reach the old aspiration level. We describe three examples in which the counterintuitive satisficing response to taxation seems plausible.
Example 1 (Drugs and sex):
The addiction literature frequently finds that aggregate consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs is price insensitive and that consumption takes on more risky forms when availability is restricted (McGeorge and Aitken (1997) , Österberg (1990) , Popham et al (1972) ). The satisficing hypothesis would therefore seem a worthwhile consideration in trying to anticipate the effects of proposals aimed at dealing with alcohol and drug consumption. The satisficing hypothesis again seems relevant in debates about sexual risk-taking, where proposed interventions seek to reduce sexually transmitted disease, discourage teenage pregnancy, or expand opportunities for women in labor markets. Insofar as individuals possess relatively fixed aspiration levels for sexual satisfaction, satisficing theory suggests that sanctions against sexual risk-taking would lead to additional risk-taking, which is the opposite of the intended effect. Aspiration seekers would respond to easy availability of low-risk forms of sexual gratification by reducing risky behavior. The policy in Germany and a handful of European countries of permitting soft pornography to be broadcast over publicly owned frequencies could, for example, be understood as a risk-deterring subsidy of sexual gratification. The interpretation depends on the assumption that there is a fraction of gratification seekers who are satisficed by pornographic broadcasts and consequently forego riskier forms of consumption.
Example 2 (Social safety nets and insufficient risk-taking):
The argument is sometimes put forward that government provision of social safety nets in the form of medical, unemployment, and pension insurance encourages entrepreneurship. If the next best alternative to self-employment is working for a large firm that provides those benefits, the opportunity cost of starting a new business would be smaller the more extensive the safety net is. Much has been written on entrepreneurship and selfemployment and we only wish to point out that certain reduced-form correlations, such as the highly entrepreneurial cultures of China and the U.S. compared to those in countries with more extensive social safety nets, seem to match the qualitative predictions of a naive satisficing model. Thus, it could be that reductions in risk provided by safety nets do not promote risk-taking as much as high aspirations for wealth do.
Example 3 (Retirement saving): Given that financial risks are difficult to quantify or even define, it may be reasonable for retirement savers to aim for expectedreturn targets rather than maximizing a mean-variance objective. There is evidence that labor-supply decisions sometimes follow a target-satisficing process (Camerer et al, 1997) . 6 If so, policies designed to promote financial risk-taking, for example in transition economies whose publics have relatively little investment experience, would need to consider the contrasting implications of satisficing versus expected-utility maximization hypotheses. Subsidies such as tax-free savings accounts and defined-6 Doubts have been put forward concerning the negative wage elasticity of cab drivers' labor supply (e.g., Farber (2003) and those cited in Goette, Fehr and Huffman (2004) ). The finding has been replicated, however, in Singapore (Chou, 2002) . Satisficing wage laborers have been observed independently in other settings, such as Weber's (1958, pp. 59-60) account of "pre-capitalist" agricultural workers who reportedly worked fewer hours at high-wage harvest times.
benefit pension guarantees in a population of satisficers could lead to reductions in aggregate financial risk-taking, because those policies satisfice savers at lower levels of risk-taking.
A limitation of the model presented in this paper is its consideration of only two behavioral hypotheses. As researchers seek psychological explanations for social and individual-level decision-making phenomena they observe, satisficing is only one among many directions to consider although Simon (1982) argued that it should be a prominent one. Another limitation of the model is that risk-taking has no formal price. This feature of the model may apply literally to thrill-seeking opportunities in public places, such as swimming on public beaches and rock climbing in public parks or hunting and foraging opportunities in our evolutionary past. For goods with positive prices, the risky return in the model should be interpreted as net surplus, the difference between reservation price and market price. Instead of forgone consumption or time costs, the reasons why individuals do not typically maximize returns are risk aversion among expected utility maximizers and lack of global knowledge about the structure of the environment among satisficers. The model abstracts from general equilibrium effects by focusing solely on a single-dimensional risky decision.
The model describes one mechanism through which behavioral hypotheses can influence a benevolent policy maker's willingness to adopt paternalistic regulation.
Psychological models of man do not necessarily increase the rationale for paternalism because psychological or behavioral hypotheses do not necessarily imply losses in economic efficiency. Depending on the returns-generating environment and the policy maker's desired level of paternalism, the satisficing hypothesis may increase or decrease the apparent benefits of risk-limiting paternalistic intervention. 
It is straightforward to show that points covered by conditions (27), (28) and (29) are equivalent to the single condition: 
